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In the second half of 2009, when economic indicators signalled the end of an exceptionally deep and sharp economic 
contraction the news was welcomed with a strong sense of relief. Nevertheless, the view prevailed that the crisis 
would leave its imprint on both the intellectual and actual foundations of our economies in the years to come. Three 
of the four leading articles of the present issue of the BEPA Monthly deal with this kind of “after-pains”. 
A particularly evident manifestation of the crisis was the sudden and quite dramatic reassessment of sovereign risks by 
financial markets as evidenced by a sharp increase in bond spreads and credit default swaps (CDS) premia in the sec-
ond half of 2008. In recent months, following a return to more normal conditions, new pressure has been building up 
in EU countries where the recession exposed and amplified existing imbalances. Based on a brief review of events 
Tassos Belessiotis, Vítor Gaspar and Marion Labouré underscore how, compared to the early years of the euro, 
market discipline is turning into an effective instrument enforcing overdue fiscal adjustments.
Against the backdrop of the strained situation of Greek public finances, Vítor Gaspar and Tassos Belessiotis take a 
look at sovereign risk management in the euro area. They briefly recap the economic rational of the EU fiscal surveil-
lance framework and its key procedural elements to make a more specific point about crisis provisions. In particular, 
they point out that taking the effectiveness of rules and procedures for granted, neither the Treaty nor the SGP in-
clude provisions on crisis management. Such omissions, they argue, undermine the interests of creditors and debtors 
alike and weigh on the resolution and adjustment capacity of the euro area.
Brigitte Young and Helene Schuberth throw the spotlight on the gender issues associated with the financial and 
economic crisis. They present a line of thought that lately has received increasing attention, notably that the excessive 
degree of risk taking observed ahead of the great recession may inter alia have resulted from a male gender bias in the 
financial industry and in financial supervision. The emblematic proposition of the authors is that a lot of damage 
could have been averted if “Lehman brothers” would have been “Lehman sisters” or “Lehman brothers and sisters”.
The fourth leading article authored by Iván Martín discusses ways to cope with the building up of demographic and 
labour market imbalances on both sides of the Mediterranean basin and the associated employment challenges, nota-
bly fast growing populations and a huge supply of labour on the southern rim as opposed to prospectively declining 
populations and a shortage of labour in Europe. Iván Martín concludes that migration to Europe can only be part of 
the solution and that policy efforts aimed at improving economic and labour market conditions in the Arab Mediterra-
nean countries must take priority. 
BEPA Monthly Brief - February 2010, Issue 34
2
protection from seller must pay $500,000 per 
year.
Two sets of factors can explain movements in 
the CDS and bond spreads: first, changes in gen-
eral risk aversion that affect preference for com-
parable assets of all countries, and, second, char-
acteristics specific to each country which reflect 
credit, default and liquidity risk.
II. Two years of volatility and widening 
spreads
In the presence of generalized risk aversion, 
yields and CDS spreads for all countries should 
in principle move in the same direction as risk. 
Attinasi et al. (2009)1 find that the risk was trans-
ferred from the banking to the government sec-
tor causing sovereign spreads to widen against a 
narrowing of spreads and improving risk in the 
private banking sector. However, in the presence 
of idiosyncratic characteristics yield differentials 
and CDS spreads for those with the weakest fun-
damentals will diverge notably from those which 
do not share these vulnerabilities. These trends 
have affected Greece since the autumn 2009 and, 
more recently, other euro area members namely 
Portugal and Spain. Attinasi et al. (2009) attribute 
56% of the widening of spreads against bunds to 
international risk aversion, 21% to expected gov-
ernment deficit and debt, 14% to liquidity condi-
tions and 9% to the announcement of rescue 
packages.2 The data in the attached tables con-
firm the poor state of the public finances in the 
EU and in the euro area which, together with 
structural features of several of those euro area 
economies, is contributing to the current ten-
sions in bond markets.
The graphs confirm that the sharp widening of 
spreads – affecting Greece – is a recent phe-
nomenon which begun in September 2008. The 
onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 
caused sovereign spreads and CDS to rise com-
pared to the narrow yields observed during the 
early years of EMU, but the widening had been 
modest judged against subsequent developments. 
Recall, finally, that while the early years of EMU 
saw a marked compression of spreads to the 
point that doubts were raised about the ability of 
financial markets to exert fiscal discipline, in re-
1 Sovereign CDS and Bond Spreads in the Euro Area since the 
Outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis
By Vítor Gaspar, Tassos Belessiotis and Marion Labouré
Since the autumn of 2009 there has been a 
marked widening of sovereign credit default 
swaps (CDS) affecting some southern countries 
participating in the euro area. The present note 
takes a brief two-year perspective, January 2008 
to February 2010, on the behaviour of sovereign 
CDS and sovereign bond spreads. Graphs 1 and 
2 present data on 10-year bond spreads against 
bund, and Graphs 3 and 4 present data on 10-
year CDS spreads. Graphs 1 and 3 date back to 
the early years of the euro until the end of Oc-
tober 2008 when the global crisis intensified, 
and Graphs 2 and 4 focus on latest develop-
ments since the end of October 2008.
The data is characterized by high volatility dur-
ing this latter period marked by two episodes. A 
first, of widening spreads, occurred in the after-
math of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, Sep-
tember 2008. Pressure persisted and a second, 
lower, peak was observed in the spring 2009. 
Upon return to more normal conditions subse-
quently, a renewed episode of widening spreads 
begun in the autumn 2009 and continues to 
date. During this latter period, Greece has stood 
apart characterized by idiosyncratic risk related 
principally but not exclusively to the state of her 
public finances. Recent developments stand in 
marked contrast to earlier years. The period 
1999-2001, just before Greece joined the euro 
area, was characterized by a strong and fast nar-
rowing of bond yield spreads. Spreads were sta-
ble and narrow for the whole period, up to the 
outbreak of the global crisis in August 2007.
I. What is a CDS?
A CDS, a common type of a credit derivative, is 
a contract where one side of the transaction 
buys protection against default of its counter-
party. The buyer of the CDS makes regular pay-
ments (in the form of a premium) to a third 
party and receives in exchange a pre-determined 
amount upon expiry of the CDS contract or in 
the event of default. The “spread” of a CDS is 
the annual amount the protection buyer must 
pay the seller over the length of the contract. 
For example, if a sovereign CDS spread is 500 
basis points, or 5.0% (1 basis point = 0.01%), 
then an investor buying $10 million worth of 
BEPA Monthly Brief - February 2010, Issue 34
3
cent months financial market pressures have 
been intense in the typical case of Greece.
III. The early 2009 peak
The pivotal event in September 2008 was the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Capital markets 
experienced subsequently a period of extreme 
volatility, during which the Dow-Jones index saw 
its largest one-day point loss, its largest intra-day 
fluctuation range (more than 1,000 points) and 
its largest daily point gain. Amidst rapidly dete-
riorating financial conditions the US, several EU 
governments and other governments internation-
ally announced rescue packages unprecedentedly 
large for peacetimes. The conviction that govern-
ments would support adjustment and restore sta-
bility using all available financial means led 
slowly to declining bond and CDS spreads which 
had peaked in March 2009. Another factor con-
tributing decisively to easing of tensions has been 
the expansionary monetary policy and the non-
conventional measures adopted by central banks 
internationally.
The peak of early 2009 reflects the importance of 
liquidity effects, the investors’ willingness to pay 
a premium for assets that can be liquidated easily 
and at low cost. The ECB suggests that liquidity 
effects dominated in the elevated sovereign bond 
spreads observed during this episode, essentially 
implying that the importance of sovereign credit 
quality may have been a lesser factor in the sharp 
increase in and the high values of yields3 and of 
CDS. As uncertainty about short-term develop-
ments in bond yields subsided, bond market con-
ditions returned to a more normal state after 
March 2009, yet volatility remained high com-
pared to the pre-August 2007 readings.
IV. Autumn 2009 and after
After a significant decline in the weeks following 
the March peaks, bond and CDS spreads wid-
ened moderately in June 2009 as emphasis 
shifted towards the sustainability of the recovery. 
Spreads continued to decline into the autumn 
but some differentiation was already becoming 
evident with Greece and Ireland seeing signifi-
cantly higher values than Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. And since the end of November a marked 
differentiation has emerged with Greece and Ire-
land forming one group and Italy, Portugal and 
Spain another. Progressively since the end of 
November, Greece’s sovereign bond spreads and 
CDS have widened significantly to levels un-
precedented since the country became a member 
of the single currency.
Such levels of CDS and bond spreads signal a 
crisis situation. The principal determinants of 
these developments have been uncertainty about 
the viability of public finances and low potential 
growth prospects. Greece foremost, but also Ire-
land, has experienced a dramatic deterioration of 
their fiscal positions with Greece’s debt ratio ex-
ceeding 110% of GDP. In recent weeks there 
has been a widening of spreads in the case of 
Portugal and Spain but those of Ireland have re-
ceded somewhat. No discerning path is so far 
visible in Italy’s case.
Recent trends in bond spreads and CDS premia 
constitute a break from a history of narrow 
spreads characterizing the early years of euro 
area when market discipline appeared to be 
weak. Now, market discipline has become severe 
and has contributed to the sense of crisis. Box 1 
provides some insights about the complex nexus 
of default risk and yield spreads.  Assuming a 
recovery rate of 60% (loss rate of 40%) in the 
case of default it is possible to recover the break 
even probability of default for various levels of 
CDS spreads. For example the table in Box 1 
shows that for a 500 basis points spread the 
break-even probability of default is 12.5%, corre-
sponding to an expected time to default of eight 
years. For the same assumptions the probability 
of default in less than 10 years exceeds 70%. For 
a spread of 200 basis points, the expected time to 
default increases to 20 years and the probability 
of default within 10 years falls to less than 40%. 
In both cases, however, these probabilities are 
far from negligible.
ENDNOTES
1 See M. G. Attinasi, C. Checherita and C. Nickel (2009), 
“What Explains the Surge in Eurozone Sovereign Spreads 
during the Financial Crisis of 2007-09?”, ECB Working 
Paper, No. 1131/2009; available at http://www.ecb.int/
pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1131.pdf .
2 See M. G. Attinasi et al, op. cit. footnote 1.
3 See “New Evidence on Credit and Liquidity Premia in 
Selected Euro Area Sovereign Yields”, ECB Bulletin, Sep-
tember 2009; available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
mobu/mb200909en.pdf. While the analysis is limited to 
German and French data, the ECB stresses “it is plausible 
that liquidity effects have significantly affected government 
bond yields in other euro area countries as well” (p. 38).
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Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, European Economic Forecast-Autumn 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16055_en.pdf 
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30,0% 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,0
50 5,0% 1,7% 1,3% 1,0% 0,8% 0,6% 0,6% 0,5%
100 10,0% 3,3% 2,5% 2,0% 1,7% 1,3% 1,1% 1,0%
150 15,0% 5,0% 3,8% 3,0% 2,5% 1,9% 1,7% 1,5%
200 20,0% 6,7% 5,0% 4,0% 3,3% 2,5% 2,2% 2,0%
250 25,0% 8,3% 6,3% 5,0% 4,2% 3,1% 2,8% 2,5%
300 30,0% 10,0% 7,5% 6,0% 5,0% 3,8% 3,3% 3,0%
350 35,0% 11,7% 8,8% 7,0% 5,8% 4,4% 3,9% 3,5%
400 40,0% 13,3% 10,0% 8,0% 6,7% 5,0% 4,4% 4,0%
450 45,0% 15,0% 11,3% 9,0% 7,5% 5,6% 5,0% 4,5%
500 50,0% 16,7% 12,5% 10,0% 8,3% 6,3% 5,6% 5,0%
CDS Spreads
Recovery Rate
Panel A: Break-even probability of default
Source: our own calculations.
Panel B: Expected time to default & other statistical indicators
Source: our own calculations.
25, 0% 12, 5% 10, 0% 7, 5% 5, 0% 2, 5% 1,2 5%
Expected time to default 4 8 1 0 13 20 40 80
Probabi lity of default w ithi n ten year s 91 ,8% 71 ,3% 63 ,2% 52 ,8% 39 ,3% 22 ,1% 11 ,8%
Probabi lity of default w ithi n five ye ars 71 ,3% 46 ,5% 39 ,3% 31 ,3% 22 ,1% 11 ,8% 6 ,1%
Yearly probability of default
Simulation Table
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2 Sovereign Risk Management in the Euro Area
By Vítor Gaspar et Tassos Belessiotis
The euro area is accompanied by binding rules 
and procedures on Member States to ensure 
budgetary discipline. The Maastricht Treaty con-
tains these provisions, which have been also re-
produced in the Lisbon Treaty. In a monetary 
union with a decentralized fiscal policy, the need 
for budgetary rules and procedures is advocated 
on the assumption that market discipline alone 
will not be sufficient to ensure fiscal discipline 
and stability.
For example, the Delors Report (Committee for 
the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 
1989) stated (page 24) the following: “[…] experi-
ence suggests that market perceptions do not nec-
essarily provide strong and compelling signals and 
that access to a large capital market may, for some 
time, facilitate the financing of economic imbal-
ances. Rather than leading to a gradual adaptation 
of borrowing costs, market views about the cred-
itworthiness of official borrowers tend to change 
abruptly and result in the closure of access to 
market financing. The constraints imposed by 
market forces might either be too slow and weak 
or too sudden and disruptive. Hence countries 
would have to accept that sharing a common mar-
ket and a single currency area imposed policy con-
straints.” In a companion piece, Lamfalussy 
(1989) reiterates that there is “reason to be scepti-
cal about the adequacy of sanctions imposed by 
the market mechanism”.1 There is a large litera-
ture crystallizing evidence on the behaviour of 
bond markets – see recent contributions in Ber-
noth, Schuknecht and von Hagen (2006) and 
Schuknecht and von Hagen (2008).
The relevant provisions in the Lisbon Treaty 
(“Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”) are as follows. Articles 120 and 121 rec-
ommend that Member States conduct their eco-
nomic policies with a view of achieving the ob-
jectives of the Union and regard their policies as 
a matter of common concern. In case a Member 
State does not behave in conformity with the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (art. 121.2) or risks 
jeopardizing the smooth functioning of eco-
nomic and monetary union, it may be subject to 
warnings by the European Commission and to 
recommendations from the EU’s Council of 
Ministers (art. 121.4). 
Article 123 prohibits monetary financing of gen-
eral government; Article 124 rules out privileged 
access to financial institutions and Article 125 
excludes Union or Member States liability for 
another’s commitment. And, Article 122 fore-
sees the possibility of EU assistance in case a 
Member State “is in difficulties or is severely 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by 
natural disasters or exceptional occurrences be-
yond its control […]”
Finally, Article 126 of the Treaty imposes on 
Member States the obligation to avoid excessive 
deficits. The Article also specifies details about 
the functioning of the excessive deficit procedure 
and, in particular, defines corrective measures to 
redress excessive deficits whenever they occur, 
including sanctions in the event the Council rec-
ommendations are not fulfilled. The aspects just 
described are often referred to as the corrective arm 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). More-
over, Council Regulation 1466/97 amended by 
Council Regulation 1055/05, on strengthening 
the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies, defines rules that govern stability and 
convergence programmes which aim at prevent-
ing, at an early stage, excessive deficits. By anal-
ogy, these provisions are referred to as the preven-
tive arm of the SGP. 
One of the most discernible consequences of the 
creation of the euro area was the deepening of 
financial market integration. The process of fi-
nancial integration was particularly marked in 
bond markets. In fact, Capiello, Engle and 
Shaphard (2006) show that correlations between 
bond returns issued by the governments of 
countries participating in the euro area ap-
proached unity after 1999. And as is clear from 
Charts included in the companion piece by Tas-
sos Belessiotis and Marion Labouré (in this issue 
of the BEPA Monthly) for most of the first dec-
ade of the euro area, sovereign bond yield differ-
entials have been small, only rarely exceeding 
30 basis points. 
More generally, the creation of the euro area has 
been associated with “One Money, One Market” 
integration dynamics in which the single currency 
boosts the integration drive of the single market. 
These trends are essential.
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There is a fundamental difficulty concerning sov-
ereign borrowing: if it is strong enough to defend 
property rights, it is also strong enough to expro-
priate them. How can a sovereign credible prom-
ise to repay debt in the future? At first sight that 
may appear as a problem to the sovereign’s 
creditors and a privilege to the sovereign. Such a 
conclusion, however, would be erroneous. With-
out guarantee of re-payment potential creditors 
will not extend credit in the first place. The solu-
tion to this problem was worked out in the 17th 
and 18th centuries through the separation of 
powers and the subjection of the sovereign to 
the rule of law. Nevertheless sovereign defaults 
are not rare events. In their review of the avail-
able evidence Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) write:
“[…] country default is often the result of a com-
plex cost-benefit calculus involving political and 
social considerations as well as economic and 
financial ones. Most countries default long be-
fore a nation literally runs out of resources.”
They conclude that a country’s ability to borrow 
abroad relies on the government’s concern about 
future access to financial markets, broader impli-
cations on trade relations (namely through the 
pervasive importance of trade finance) and 
broader consequences for international relations. 
Clearly, all of these factors operated with un-
precedented force with the creation of the euro 
area. Financial inflows into countries like Portu-
gal, Ireland, Greece and Spain have been large 
and persistent. And the on-going crisis in 
Greece’s general government financial position 
brings all these considerations in sharp focus.
For most of the period after Greece joined the 
euro area, in 2001, financing was abundant, and 
yield differentials and Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) premia narrow. The situation, however, 
changed dramatically for systemic reasons, in the 
autumn of 2008, in the financial turmoil associ-
ated with the Global Crisis. It changed again to-
wards the end of 2009, this time for reasons 
more related to news concerning the situation 
and prospects for general government finances 
in Greece. As feared in the Delors Report, mar-
ket forces were first “too slow and weak” and 
later “too sudden and disruptive”. Up to the 
summer of 2007, market forces proved too slow 
and weak. After the autumn of 2008 and espe-
cially since end of 2009, they are proving too 
sudden and disruptive. In our experience with 
the SGP, the joint operation of the preventive 
and corrective arms has been unable to deliver 
the stability and sustainability it was intended to 
produce. In fact, the large and persistent bond 
yield differentials and CDS spreads observed in 
markets reflect surprisingly high probabilities of 
sovereign default over the medium term. How-
ever, having assumed the effectiveness of the 
foreseen rules and procedures, the Treaty did not 
include provisions on crisis management. Such 
omission undercuts the interests of creditors and 
debtors alike. 
Crisis management is always difficult in real time. 
Decisions taken under the pressure of the mo-
ment rarely meet the requirements of a long-term 
perspective. Now protection of creditors calls for 
– as in the early years of the emergence of con-
stitutional arrangements restricting the power of 
the sovereign by the rule of law – constitutional 
protection. As historical experience amply dem-
onstrates, such solution benefits creditors and 
debtors alike. Institutional change, in England, in 
the context of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, 
ensuring the rights of creditors provided the 
ground to financial development and facilitated 
the Industrial Revolution.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Monetary System, including the financial provi-
sions that facilitated adjustment in the event of 
misalignment, protected the interests of creditors 
and provided proper incentives for the conduct 
of stability-oriented policies. A mechanism ful-
filling the same functions is urgently needed for 
the euro area.
ENDNOTES
1 Quoted in footnote 5 of Detken, Gaspar and Winkler 
(2004).
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At the World Economic Forum in Davos, some 
of the discussions revolved around whether we 
would be in the same mess today if Lehman 
Brothers had been Lehman Sisters. Or, if we 
might have been better off, had it been “Lehman 
Brothers and Sisters”. Whether the crisis could 
have been avoided if more women had been at 
the helm of large investment banks or of regula-
tory institutions is a hotly contested issue. But 
the crisis has turned a spot-light on the low or 
even non-existent female representation in top 
positions of financial institution, and also in the 
decision making bodies of key regulatory institu-
tions, central banks, supervisory and, formal and 
informal financial networks. Female leadership in 
European financial committees and institutions 
is particularly low.
In the UK, 11.7% of FTSE 100 directors are fe-
male – up by barely five percentage points over 
10 years. Only 7.5% of the directors of the 
French enterprises represented in the CAC 40 
are women. The situation in Germany is even 
worse with only 1 female management board 
member from the 200 or so executives in the 
Dax-30 companies. The share of female directors 
in the Austrian ATX companies stagnates at 
3.5%. Just 3% of Fortune 500 chief executives 
are women. Across Europe, only 10% of board 
directors of the largest companies are female, 
and the numbers are even lower in Asia. Norway 
is the exception in that the boards of directors of 
listed companies are required to have 40% fe-
males. With respect to the boards of directors of 
banks in the European Union, the presence of 
women is a negligible 7%. According to a new 
report from the US National Council for Re-
search on Women, a mere 10% of all traditional 
mutual-fund managers in the US are women, and 
they manage a scant 3% of the approximately 
$2 trillion invested in hedge funds. The average 
size of US-funds run by women is $73.7 million 
compared with $308 million for men. There is 
increasing evidence that women-owned funds 
outperform funds in general. The Hedge Fund 
Research Diversity Index, for example, which 
tracks the performance of women along with 
minority groups, shows that women-owned 
funds delivered an average annual return of 
8.21% since 2003, compared with the broader 
index which returned 5.98%. During the finan-
cial crisis, the value of female-managed funds 
dropped by 9.6% compared with a plunge of 
19% for the rest, according to Chicago-based 
Hedge Fund Research.
A certain “groupthink” – a result of boards 
drawn from a narrow social group – has been 
widely blamed for the financial crisis we find 
ourselves in today. A growing body of academic 
work in the US and Europe suggests that there is 
a correlation between the number of women in a 
company’s leadership and the company’s profit-
ability. Men generally assess risk differently than 
women. According to new research, financial 
performance is best when there is a critical mass 
of women – defined as 40% or more. In com-
parison to the riskier investment behaviour of 
men in finance, women take into account a wider 
multiple of variables when present in sufficient 
numbers. From the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy, decision-making on policies with dis-
tributional effects need broad-based participation 
of those affected by it. In a report on reforms of 
the international monetary and financial system, 
the Stiglitz Commission concludes that “those 
who are affected by the failure of regulation… 
should have a large voice in any regulatory struc-
ture”. However, it should not come as a surprise 
that in all of the wise men and expert committees 
that were set up by the G20 to prepare proposals 
for regulatory reforms women are largely absent. 
Similarly, the De Larosière Group which pre-
pared proposals for EU regulatory reforms and 
architecture had only male members. The same 
holds true for the G20 Working Group on the 
reform of the IMF. Even the Stiglitz Commis-
sion had only two female representatives. But as 
Albert Einstein famously remarked, “we can’t 
solve problems by using the same kind of think-
ing we used when we created them”.
Female representation in financial governance is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for fi-
nancial markets to serve collective over private 
interests. Female representation only makes a 
3 Financial Crisis and its Gender Dimensions
By Brigitte Young* and Helene Schuberth**
* Professor of International Political Economy, Institute for Political Science, University Muenster, Germany.
** Economist and Senior Advisor at the National Bank of Austria. 
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difference if it comes with an alternative concept 
of financial governance that takes into account 
the social needs of stakeholders rather than 
maximizing the shareholder returns at the ex-
pense of wages and social values. Thus the issue 
is not just who sits at the helm of regulatory 
agencies, global financial institutions and who 
regulates and manages the funds. More impor-
tant are questions such as who benefits and why, 
and what might be a more sustainable financial 
alternative that aims at generating high levels of 
employment.
This crisis differs in severity and impact from 
previous down-turns. Women may temporarily 
be safer in their jobs, but find it difficult to sup-
port their families due to the general lower wages 
and precarious employment. Women are more 
likely to be employed in part-time jobs, receive 
lower wages, have shorter hours, and work in 
smaller firms. Consequently, the impact of the 
recession on women and men will depend on the 
type of job they hold. Men are better positioned 
to weather the crisis, because on average they 
have greater wealth, more job benefits and 
higher wages. Nevertheless, the crisis demon-
strates both the advances women have made in 
the labour market and their partial and discrimi-
natory integration. Women today are to a much 
greater extent present in the labour market than 
at any time before, but the growth of dual-earner 
families means that many more households rely 
on two incomes to make ends meet. Thus the 
job loss of a male earner with social benefits re-
sults in a decline in social coverage for the entire 
family. In Europe, the creation of many “one 
and a half” earner households based on a full-
time male worker and a part-time female high-
lights the problems resulting from women’s con-
centration in part-time work. A part-time worker 
is simply unable to earn sufficient income to sup-
port the household if the full-time working part-
ner loses his job.
To counter the severe economic contraction, the 
developed and to some extent the middle income 
countries have engaged in banking stabilisation 
measures, expansionary monetary policies includ-
ing non-standard measures and fiscal stimulus. 
By the end of February 2009, the financial rescue 
schemes which involve capital injections, guaran-
tees of issuance of banking securities, bank asset 
purchases, swaps and other guarantees amounted 
to a total government commitment of 22% of 
GDP for the European Union and 29% of GDP 
for the United States. Banking packages have 
stabilized the banking sector and financial mar-
kets, but they have also guaranteed the wealth of 
shareholders and unsecured creditors as well as 
dividend payments and higher (executive) wages 
in the financial industries. These steps are fa-
vouring men disproportionally. With the excep-
tion of Iceland which placed women in charge of 
its newly state-controlled banks, conditionality 
was not imposed on public funding for financial 
institutions to increase the female quota on the 
boards. Thus gender equality, as a corporate goal, 
has not entered the political debate on condition-
ality which focuses largely on manager compen-
sation and credit availability.
Yet the crisis is also a great opportunity to rem-
edy the situation and put in place a financial ar-
chitecture and an economic growth model which 
serve social values instead of privileging the fi-
nancial sector. Both gender inequalities and in-
come inequalities are the result of a certain 
“group think” mentality which is exclusive and 
exclusionary, and carries a set of outdated norms 
about women and men. Governments and busi-
ness leaders have an important leadership role in 
rescuing the financial and banking sectors. They 
also have an important role in avoiding future 
calamities. The crisis provides an opportunity to 
disavow old beliefs and embed financial activities 
within the larger social sphere, thereby benefit-
ting women and men in developed and develop-
ing countries.
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4 A Win-Win Match of Labour Demand and Supply 
across the Mediterranean
By Iván Martín*
Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs, i.e. 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Palestine and Syria) are, taken together, 
the world region with arguably the most 
daunting employment challenge, at least in 
relative terms. Official labour participation rates 
are the lowest in the world (below 46% of 
working age population as compared to the 
world average of 61.2%), reflecting the lowest 
female participation rate in the world (below 
25% as compared to the world average of 42%). 
Despite this, average unemployment rates 
(almost 15% of the labour force) are higher than 
in any other region with the exception of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Demographic projections for the coming 10 to 
15 years, with an expected increase in the 
working age population of 2.5 million a year (see 
Graph 1), make all foreseeable scenarios even 
bleaker. Adding together the projected needs for 
new jobs calculated under conservative 
assumptions on the basis of national statistical 
sources, the AMCs will need more than 
1,500,000 additional jobs a year over the coming 
10 years in order to provide employment 
opportunities for new labour market entrants 
and to keep the number of unemployed 
unchanged (already 7 million before the crisis). 
And these figures may be significantly 
underestimated, since they are based on the 
(hardly realistic) assumption that there will be 
constant labour participation rates. The 
15 million new jobs which are needed until 2020 
would therefore mean an increase of 30% in 
relation to the current level of total employment 
in those countries, and would amount to 
between 1/3 and 2/3 more jobs per year than 
those that have been created over the last 5 years 
in the region, a period of marked economic 
prosperity with average yearly 5% growth rates 
for the region.
A Study commissioned by DG ECFIN and DG 
Employment in 20091 concludes that immediate 
action is needed, because the status quo in terms 
of employment risks is causing not only serious 
social and even political instability, but also a 
permanent damage to the development 
prospects of those countries. The same Study 
also shows that the demographic evolution and 
skills profile of the EU offer opportunities for 
win-win matching strategies between EU 
potential labour demand and AMC labour 
supply, provided that the right cooperative 
strategies are implemented.
In the near future, there is not doubt that 
Europe will need an increased inflow of skilled 
labour. The Commission Communication “New 
Skills for New Jobs. Anticipating and matching 
labour market and skills needs”2 highlighted this 
point in a context of economic crisis and 
transformation of the economic model. In this 
regard, the preparatory CEDEFOP3 report on 
Future Skill Needs in Europe, even if it was 
written before the current economic global 
recession, is still fully relevant for understanding 
the long-term direction of European labour 
demand. Thus, in the course of the coming 
5 years more skilled labour will be needed. 
Whichever scenario is considered, a decline in 
low-skill demand (-1.9%) will be compensated by 
an increase in medium-skilled (1%) and even 
more in high-skilled labour demand (2.4%).4
On the other hand, the abovementioned Labour 
Markets and Migration Study shows that AMCs 
instead suffer from an excess and increasing 
supply of educated workers. Unemployment 
affects mainly the young (15-29 years old), and 
increases with the level of education (see 
Graph 2). It is frictional for the level below 
middle school and increases for general 
secondary, technical secondary, post secondary 
institute and university. The higher 
unemployment rates among the highly educated 
are common to all the AMCs, and the number of 
graduate unemployed has already reached 
1 million and is increasing rapidly (and this 
without taking into consideration the high rate of 
inactivity among graduate women). Of course, 
not all the graduate unemployed are ready to 
emigrate, and in particular not all unemployed 
women are ready to do so. This notwithstanding, 
AMCs provide an available pool of foreign 
* Associate Researcher at the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI), Madrid, Spain.
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skilled labour because there is an available 
graduate labour supply and, in the foreseeable 
future, a lack of sufficient labour demand for 
skilled workers. This matching of EU medium-
and highly-skilled labour demand and AMCs 
excess labour supply would be mutually 
beneficial and would partially dampen the main 
factor for social instability in the region. This 
could also have positive externalities for Europe 
by preventing spill-over into the neighbouring 
European countries.
Now, whereas the AMC supply of labour seems 
to match the European demand, a major 
problem is the question of whether the quality of 
the human capital and skilled labour produced in 
AMCs is the type of quality demanded in 
Europe, i.e., whether high- or medium-skilled 
labour in AMCs is also high- or medium-skilled 
in the Europe. One of the standard elements of 
all diagnosis of AMC labour markets relates 
precisely to the mismatch between skills 
endowed through the education system and 
those demanded by the labour markets, whether 
national or international.
However, this synergy is contingent upon an 
effective and immediate skills upgrading of 
labour forces in the AMCs (this should become a 
priority for EU-AMC economic cooperation) 
and the setting up of a friendly climate for legal 
migration in the EU, effectively attracting skilled 
migrants. According to the conclusions of that 
Study and the background paper on EU 
migration,5 the current instruments of EU 
migration policy, including the recently approved 
Blue Card, do not seem to provide for this. 
These are two important question marks to recall 
in matching supply on one side of the 
Mediterranean and demand on the other, and 
should guide policy action both on EU-AMCs 
cooperation and on EU migration policy.
Indeed, another report published in early 2009 
by the World Bank6 argues that Middle East and 
North African (MENA) countries are currently 
not well placed to meet increased demand for 
labour in the European Union. Whether 
assuming zero migration or a persistence of 
current migration rates the demand for 
replacement labour in the European countries is 
projected to peak in the 2020s. But it will 
predominantly concern medium-skilled workers 
who have completed a secondary education. As a 
matter of fact, currently workers from emigration 
countries in the MENA region provide a poor 
match in relation to Europe’s needs, as the 15-
39 years old labour force will mainly expand 
among those who have completed their primary 
education. If education rates and labour force 
participation rates remain unchanged, the skill 
mismatch will become acute. It will be most 
apparent in the 2020s, when Europe’s potential 
demand for secondary-educated migrants of 
roughly 10 million will coexist with a projected 
potential supply of labour migrant with 
secondary education of only 0.5 million in 
MENA. If MENA’s emigration countries make 
an effort to increase labour force participation 
and education rates significantly, the scope for 
arbitrage would be much higher: they would thus 
deactivate destabilization potential of 
unemployment or underemployment and ensure 
a sustained flows of labour remittances, but also, 
more importantly, create the basis for a 
competitive economy in their own countries. 
Assuming, as in the scenarios developed for the 
report, that labour force participation rates and 
education rates can converge over time to the 
levels of southern European countries, the match 
between MENA and the European Union would 
improve considerably (as shown in Figure 3). 
Between 2005 and 2050, the MENA emigration 
countries would produce a net increase of 
20 million people with secondary education and 
10 million people with tertiary education. This 
scenario’s outcome will depend partly on the 
success of MENA countries in improving 
participation rates for women.
What is clear anyway is that the sheer size of 
employment creation in the AMCs implies that 
migration cannot provide a solution to the AMC 
unemployment problem. The aforementioned 
World Bank report is very clear in this respect: 
“Migration is not a panacea for sluggish job 
creation in MENA countries or for an aging 
European population, but it could form part of 
the policy approach to address these challenges”. 
As such, investment in skill development in 
AMCs and legal recruiting and migration 
schemes for AMC labour force in the EU is in 
Europe’s self-interest.
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Graph 1: Working Age Population in AMCs (000 persons), 2005-2020 
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Le monde renoue avec l’optimisme
Gallup International a refait un « Voice of the 
People Survey »1 à la fin de l’année 2009 (publié 
en Janvier 2010) pour connaître les perspectives 
économiques personnelles des citoyens de 
33 Etats du monde à l'égard de 2010 et les com-
parer avec le moral économique vis-à-vis de 2009 
affiché, dans les mêmes pays, dans le sondage 
précédent.
Les résultats traduisent que l'optimisme à l’égard de 
ce que sera la situation personnelle en 2010 pro-
gresse considérablement dans tous les continents 
(+18%), quoique dans une moindre mesure (+9%) 
dans les Etats européens interviewés (Autriche, 
République tchèque, France, Allemagne, Italie et le 
Royaume-Uni) (Graphique 1 et Carte 1). La 
France, avec les perceptions les plus négatives par-
mi les Etats membres de l’UE, ne détient pas la 
palme du pessimisme européen qui revient plutôt à 
l’Islande. Seulement 11% des Islandais pensent que 
2010 sera meilleure que 2009.
En Europe de l’Ouest, on est aussi moins opti-
miste quant à l’évolution économique générale. 
Seulement 11% des Européens interviewés, 
contre 28% en Amérique du Nord (USA et Ca-
nada) et une moyenne de 29% sur les 33 pays 
interviewés dans le monde, croient que 2010 sera 
une année de prospérité économique. 68% des 
Européens pensent également que le chômage va 
augmenter fortement ou légèrement dans les 
12 prochains mois, mais ils sont bien moins à 
penser de même en Amérique du Nord (50%) et 
dans la moyenne des 33 pays interrogés (51%) 
(Graphiques 2 et 3).
Votation sur l'interdiction des minarets en 
Suisse : Signal symbolique
Après chaque votation fédérale en Suisse, l’Insti-
tut Gfs.Bern2 réalise des enquêtes, appelées com-
munément « analyses VOX », pour comprendre 
et expliciter le sens que les électeurs ont voulu 
donner à leur vote. L’analyse de l’enquête sur la 
votation fédérale du 29 novembre 20093 sur l’in-
terdiction de la construction de minarets vient de 
s’achever. Ses auteurs, Hans Hirter et Adrian 
Vatter, professeurs de Science Politique à l’Uni-
versité de Berne s’accordent à dire que :
- Le clivage gauche-droite a été très marqué sur la 
question de l’interdiction des minarets. Les sym-
pathisants de gauche ont voté à plus de 80% 
contre l’initiative et ceux de droite à plus de 80% 
pour l’initiative.
- Les partis du centre-droit avaient recommandé 
le rejet de l’initiative. Mais leurs sympathisants se 
sont majoritairement prononcés en sa faveur. 
Cette divergence ne s’était pas vue lors des pré-
cédents votes concernant les étrangers.
- Le niveau de formation a également joué un 
rôle important. L’initiative a été approuvée à 
76% chez les personnes ayant effectué un ap-
prentissage, mais à seulement 35% chez celles 
ayant fait des études supérieures.
- Au niveau des confessions, tant les protestants 
que les catholiques ont voté à environ 60% en 
faveur de l’initiative, bien que leurs Eglises re-
commandaient le « non ».
- L’âge et le sexe des votants n’ont pas eu d'in-
fluence significative sur l’issue du vote.
Les conclusions de l’étude pointent le fait que, 
dans l’ambiance générale de xénophobie et de 
résistance contre la globalisation et de la perte 
d’identité qui en découle, les votants ont voulu 
donner un signal symbolique contre l’extension 
de l’islam en Suisse, mais non pas contre les mu-
sulmans.
On explique la grande différence entre les sonda-
ges précédant le vote (le dernier donnait un rejet 
du texte par 53%) et le vote réel par le souhait 
des répondants des sondages d'exprimer la 
« conformité sociale » (théorie de la « spirale du 
silence ») au lieu de donner leur réelle intention 
de vote.
5 What Citizens Say
By Anna Melich
ENDNOTES
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Graphique 1 : A propos de votre situation personnelle, pensez-vous que 2010 sera une année 
meilleure ou moins bonne que 2009 ?
Carte 1 : Progression de l’optimisme par grandes régions
Source : « Voice of the People Survey », Gallup International, January 2010.
Source : « Voice of the People Survey », Gallup International, January 2010.
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Source : « Voice of the People Survey », Gallup International, January 2010.
Graphique 3 : Au cours des 12 prochains mois, pensez-vous que le nombre de chômeurs [dans 
votre pays] va augmenter fortement, augmenter légèrement, rester le même, diminuer 
légèrement, diminuer fortement ?
Graphique 2 : Vous personnellement, pensez-vous que, par rapport à cette année, l’année 2010 
sera une année de prospérité économique, une année de difficultés économiques ou sera-t-
elle semblable à cette année ?
Source : « Voice of the People Survey », Gallup International, January 2010.
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Mesure des inégalités : la Belgique ouvre la 
boîte noire du ménage
L’égalité salariale figurait déjà dans le Traité de 
Rome et reste aujourd’hui le socle de la politique 
européenne d’égalité hommes/femmes. Cette dis-
position a été confirmée au fil des Traités, élargis-
sant la notion de salaire à celle de rémunération1. 
En 2009, l’égalité de rémunération faisait l’objet 
d’une campagne de sensibilisation promue par la 
Commission, l’écart entre hommes et femmes 
restant au niveau préoccupant de 17%. L’égalité 
de rémunération est importante comme recon-
naissance de la participation des femmes au mar-
ché du travail, en revanche les débats sur les situa-
tions de pauvreté et en particulier de pauvreté des 
femmes qui représentent la majorité de la popula-
tion en risque de pauvreté (36% des femmes vs 
11% des hommes) appelle des indicateurs plus 
fins sur les différences de revenus et non seule-
ment de rémunération.
D’où l’intérêt d’une étude pionnière qui vient 
d’être réalisée par le département d’Economie 
appliquée de l’Université libre de Bruxelles 
(DULBEA) pour l’Institut fédéral belge pour 
l’égalité des hommes et des femmes2 qui révèle 
que le revenu moyen des femmes a été inférieur 
de 38% à celui des hommes en 2006 en Belgique. 
Cette étude, qui n’a pas encore d’équivalent ail-
leurs en Europe, s’intéresse aux revenus person-
nels des personnes3 et se démarque des études 
classiques qui, faute de données, considèrent le 
ménage comme unité d’analyse. Pour la majorité 
des études existantes, le ménage est une boîte 
noire au sein de laquelle le partage est supposé 
être égalitaire. Cette étude révèle – notamment 
dans les cas de séparations – l’existence d’une 
dissymétrie qui cache des situations de dépen-
dance et/ou de pauvreté inconnues qui selon les 
promoteurs du projet faussent les indicateurs qui 
fondent les politiques publiques.
Les inégalités de revenu 
En moyenne, le revenu net des femmes en 2006 
s’élèvent à 12,938€ et celui des hommes à 
20,881€. Ce différentiel de revenu est valable 
pour toutes les classes d’âge, mais l’écart aug-
mente avec l’âge. De plus, les femmes se retrou-
vent à 83% dans les 10% des revenus nets des 
plus pauvres et à 22% dans les 10% les plus 
hauts (Graphique 1). Dans 78% des couples, les 
hommes ont un salaire supérieur à celui des fem-
mes. Le fait d’être en couple a un impact négatif 
sur le revenu des femmes. Elles ont tendance à 
moins participer au marché du travail surtout si 
le nombre d’enfants à charge est élevé. 
Le taux de dépendance financière indique que 
36% des femmes et 11% des hommes ont un re-
venu individuel inférieur au seuil de 60% du reve-
nu médian individuel. Il varie entre 9% et 14% 
pour les hommes suivant le niveau d’éducation. 
Le taux de dépendance financière des femmes est 
nettement supérieur et varie plus fortement: il est 
estimé à 52% pour les femmes justifiant d’un ni-
veau d’étude secondaire inférieur, de 39% pour 
un niveau d’étude secondaire supérieur et de 19% 
si elles justifient d’un niveau d’enseignement su-
périeur (Graphique 2). De manière générale, il a 
été montré qu’un niveau faible d’éducation ex-
pose les femmes plus que les hommes aux faibles 
revenus. Etre un homme diminue la probabilité 
de dépendance financière de 18.5% sans contrô-
ler les autres variables. Le revenu net moyen des 
femmes est égal à 56% du revenu net moyen des 
hommes avec un niveau d’éducation enseigne-
ment supérieur ou moins, à 61% pour un ensei-
gnement secondaire supérieur et à 65% avec un 
enseignement supérieur. La différence de revenu 
hommes/femmes diminue alors avec le niveau 
d’étude.
Le partage des tâches ménagères est très souvent 
inégal (Graphique 3) et représente une quantité 
importante de travail non rémunéré. Le fait d’ê-
tre mariée et d’avoir des enfants pour une femme 
augmente le temps consacré aux tâches ménagè-
res et diminue le temps de travail.
A l’heure actuelle, la proportion de célibataires en 
Europe est en constante augmentation : 28.9% 
des foyers en Europe de l’Ouest sont constitués 
de personnes habitants seules et 22% en Europe 
de l’Est. En outre, avec plus d’un couple marié 
sur trois qui divorce, il apparaît légitime de s’inté-
resser à la prise de décision du ménage et à la dé-
pendance financière. Le fait d’être une femme en 
couple marié, combiné avec enfants et un faible 
niveau d’éducation, provoquerait des situations 
encore plus critiques en cas de rupture
Cette étude, qui affine les outils d’analyse des 
inégalités de genre, a été entreprise dans le cadre 
6 Gender Matters
By Agnès Hubert et Marion Labouré
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du renforcement de la politique d’égalité qui 
s’impose aux différents secteurs de l’administra-
tion belge suite à l’adoption d’une nouvelle loi 
sur le mainstreaming du genre adoptée sur le mo-
dèle de l’obligation faite aux institutions euro-
péennes par les Traités (Article 3, para 2, Traité 
CE). Cette loi engage à évaluer et à rectifier les 
différentes répercussions que peuvent avoir les 
mesures législatives, les politiques et les program-
mes sur les femmes et sur les hommes compte 
tenu des situations de vie et des réalités socio-
économiques différentes de ces deux groupes. 
Elle devrait guider une réorientation des outils de 
lutte contre la pauvreté des femmes qui, selon 
plusieurs auteurs (cf. Esping Andersen, Esther 
Duflo), a un impact très direct avec la pauvreté 
des enfants. 
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(minima sociaux, prestations familiales, et aides au logement).
2 Genre et revenu: analyse et développement d’indicateurs – Belgian Gender and Income Analysis (BGIA).
3 Ceux dont elles disposent seules du fait de leur activité rémunérée (salaires, primes, activité complémentaire) ainsi que les 
revenus en nature et autres avantages liés à l’emploi pour les salariés; les gains ou les pertes de l’activité d’indépendant au 
titre d’activité principale ou d’activité complémentaire), les revenus du patrimoine (pensions individuelles privées, revenus 
des propriétés ou terrains en location, intérêts sur le capital, investissements financiers), transferts de l’Etat (allocations de 
chômage, pensions, indemnités  maladie, d’invalidité, congés de maternité, pensions de survie, allocations d’interruption de 
carrière, bourses d’étudiants, revenu d’intégration sociale) et transferts entre ménages (pensions alimentaires, soutien finan-
cier régulier perçu et payé).
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Source : Belgian Gender and Income Analysis (BGIA).
Graphique 1 : Proportion de femmes et d’hommes par tranche de revenus individuel net
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Source : Belgian Gender and Income Analysis (BGIA).
Graphique 2 : Taux de dépendance financière BGIA selon le niveau d’éducation
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Graphique 3 : Temps consacré au travail (non) rémunéré par les hommes et les femmes
